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AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980	

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (30 Nov 67) FOR OT RD-670612

11 December 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Reports--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st
Battalion, 27th Artillery, Period Ending 31 July 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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- Commanding Officers
 - 5th Battalion, 42d Artillery (155mm-T)
 - 6th Battalion, 84th Artillery (155-T)
 - 6th Battalion, 33d Artillery (105 How-T)
 - 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST BATTALION, 27TH ARTILLERY
APO 96268

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AVGE-TO

8 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65) (WD3EAA) (U)

THRU: Commanding Officer
23d Artillery Group
APO 96289

Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam, Artillery
ATTN: AVFB-FA-C
APO 96266

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DH
APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GFOP-OT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 20310

*Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10*

FOR OT RD
670612

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SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT HEADQUARTERS OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) Administration and Personnel.

5 a. The 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery, remains assigned to the 23d Artillery Group.

b. Normal S1 activities have been conducted during the period 1 May 1967 through 31 July 1967.

c. Personnel strength of the command on 31 July 1967 was:

UNIT	TOE AUTH			MTOE PENDING			ASSIGNED		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
Headquarters Battery	22	1	149	0	0	0	20	1	149
A Battery	3	0	94	0	0	0	3	0	107
B Battery	3	0	94	0	0	0	3	0	105
C Battery	3	0	94	0	0	0	3	0	103
Service Battery	2	3	78	0	0	0	2	3	89
TOTALS	33	4	509	0	0	0	31	4	554

d. There were no critical MOS shortages during the reporting period.

e. Personnel changes during this quarter include:

GAINS:	OFF	WO	EM	LOSSES:	OFF	WO	EM
	3	0	64		5	0	8

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f. Casualties Included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Killed in Action	1
Wounded in Action	0
Missing in Action	0
Non Battle Dead	0
Non Battle Casualties	0

g. Awards and Decorations presented to members of this command included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Silver Star	1
Legion of Merit	0
Bronze Star (Merit)	0
Bronze Star (Valor)	0
Air Medal (Merit)	1
Air Medal (Oak leaf Cluster)	0
Commendation Medal (Valor)	0
Commendation Medal (Merit)	8
Purple Heart	1

NOTE: In addition to these awards, 3 recommendations for awards have been submitted and are pending approval by USARV.

h. R&R Program schedules include the following:

(1) The in-country R&R consisting of 3 day passes to Vung Tau has been utilized by 1 person during this reporting period.

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(2) The out of country ~~mail~~ included the following 5 day

quotas:

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Bangkok	0	0	0	0
Tokyo	0	0	3	3
Manila	0	0	0	00
Hong Kong	0	0	3	3
Taipei	0	0	0	0
Singapore	0	0	0	0
Kuala Lumpur	0	0	0	0
Penang	0	0	0	0
Hawaii	0	0	0	0

i. Unit mail clerks pick up and deliver mail from the nearest APO. APO numbers for the units are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>APO</u>
Headquarters Battery	96268
A Battery	96289
B Battery	96216
C Battery	96268
Service Battery	96216

j. Judicial and Non-judicial actions by units included:

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ARTICLE 15</u>	<u>SUMMARY COURT</u>	<u>SPECIAL COURT</u>	<u>GENERAL</u>
Headquarters Battery	6	0	0	0
A Battery	9	0	0	0
B Battery	3	0	1	0
C Battery	3	0	1	0
Service Battery	9	0	1	0
TOTALS	30	0	3	0

k. Pertinent medical service statistics include:

Total Patient visits (unit personnel)	860
Admitted to hospital	16
Evacuated within the country	2
Evacuated out of country	0
Malaria cases	0

l. Reportable accidents included:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VEHICLE</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
Headquarters Battery	1	0	0
A Battery	1	0	0
B Battery	1	0	0
C Battery	1	0	1
Service Battery	2	0	2
TOTAL	6	0	3

m. The morale of the command is outstanding

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n. Educational opportunities for personnel are provided by USAFI extension courses.

9 o. Religious services, both Protestant and Catholic, are held on a regular weekly basis.

p. Throughout the Battalion, personal hygiene, prophylactic usage and frequent lectures on venereal diseases have helped in lowering the VD rate. The Battery Commander, Surgeon and Chaplain complement each other's efforts in their approach to the problem.

2. (C) Intelligence. The 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery initiated a visual Reconnaissance program on 28 July 1967. Resources allocated to the program are two fixed wing observation aircraft provided by the 21st Aviation Company. Air observers are furnished by this battalion.

3. (C) Training

a. On the job training has continued in all units of the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery. Survey personnel continue cross training in Fire Direction procedures and are used to supplement the TOE complement in 24 hours operations.

b. The following periods of mandatory training for personnel were conducted during the reporting period:

- (1) CBR Refresher: 1 Hour
- (2) Armed Forces Censorship: 1 Hour
- (3) Clandestine surveillance and listening device: 1 Hour
- (4) Command Information: 13 Hours
- (5) Civil Affairs: 1 Hour
- (6) Subversion and Espionage: 1 Hour
- (7) Survival, Evasion and Escape: 1 Hour
- (8) Geneva Convention: 1 Hour

c. Replacement training was accomplished by orientation at the 90th Replacement Battalion and a one week course at Phu Loi Replacement Training Company.

d. On 20 May 1967 two personnel attended a projectionist school conducted at Phu Loi by the 69th Signal Battalion.

e. Predeployment training and the Army Training test did not give the personnel of the unit a suitable appreciation of sustained 24 hour a day operation. Many of the early difficulties in sustaining the battalion throughout 24 hour a day operations are attributed to this lack of appreciation of the requirements associated with firing 1000 rounds per day on a continuing bases and maintaining the normal flow of maintenance administration and logistic actions.

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4. (C) Operations

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a. Normal operations consistent with the battalion mission were conducted during the reporting period.

b. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery moved its base camp from Phu Loi to Dau Tieng on 26 June 1967.

c. Service Battery moved its base camp from Phu Loi to Tay Ninh on 26 June 1967.

d. Battery B deployed from its Phu Loi staging area to its base camp in Tay Ninh on 3 May 1967.

e. Battery C departed the Phu Loi staging area on 4 May 1967, establishing base camp in Dau Tieng.

f. The 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery participated in the following operations during the reporting period.

(1) Operation LAM SON 67, conducted by the 1st Infantry Division, was supported by Battery A from 1 May to 7 July, and 29 through 31 July 1967 from the base camp location at Phu Loi. This operation was also supported by B Battery 1 - 3 May 1967 and Battery C from 1 - 4 May 1967 from positions at Phu Loi base camp.

(2) Operation Manhattan was supported by Battery C during the period 4 - 10 May 1967 from FSB Echo located at XT 458261. The battery reinforced the fires of the 25th Division Artillery under the operational control of the 3d Battalion, 13th Artillery.

(3) Operation AHINA. Batteries B and C reinforced the fires of the 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery during the period 12-19 May 1967 from firing position at Soui Da (XT343576). The operation was conducted by the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division under operational control of the 25th Infantry Division. Two forward observer parties were furnished to the 36th Ranger Battalion (ARVN), which participated in the operation as a blocking force. After termination of operation AHINA Battery B supported the withdrawal of 25th Division elements from the old French Fort (XT2867) by reinforcing the fires of the 25th Division Artillery.

(4) On 25 May Battery A displaced from its Phu Loi base camp to a firing position at XT792216 for a one day artillery assault mission. The battery fired 314 rounds on preselected targets in the Iron Triangle returning at Phu Loi the same day. A road clearing operation and security for the battery was furnished by the 2/8 Infantry Battalion (ARVN), 5th ARVN Division.

(5) Operation Diamondhead. Batteries B and C provided artillery support, mainly in a General Support Reinforcing role during the period 27 May through 31 July 1967. The operation was primarily a series of brief search and destroy operations conducted by elements of the 3d Brigade, 4th Division.

(6) From 1 June-9 July the battalion headquarters operated the FSCC for the Dau Tieng Base Camp Defense, controlling the fires of all artillery and mortar units positioned at Dau Tieng. The mission included the planning and coordination of the H&I program, counter mortar program, defensive concentrations, and a counter rocket program in support of the base camp defense.

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(7) Operation PIKESVILLE, 12 June - 1 July 1967. Two forward observer parties were provided to Special Forces teams conducting reconnaissance in Area of Operation BEAR. AO BEAR formed an inverted triangle with its apex the river junction at XT 4554 and the legs extending north to the Cambodian border at XT 3090 and XT 5991.

(8) Battery A conducted a one day artillery assault on 19 June 1967, moving from Phu Loi to a firing position at XT 773205. The battery fired 186 rounds of ammunition at preselected targets and returned to the Phu Loi Base Camp the same day.

(9) From 7 to 29 July Battery A from a position at XT 024147, fired in support of search and destroy operations conducted by the 1st Brigade, 1st Infantry Division in AO Strike. During the same period the battery also provided artillery support to the Dong Nai Sector.

g. Calibration of the battalions howitzers was accomplished during June and July by the 177 Ordnance Detachment.

h. The following number of missions were fired with total amounts of ammunition listed below:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO OF MISSIONS FIRED</u>	<u>AMMO EXPENDED</u> <u>155MM</u>
Battery A	4419	42,197
Battery B	4742	23,996
Battery C	5526	25,371
TOTAL	14,687	91,564

5. (C) Logistics

a. Supply

(1) Class I and III support has been superior throughout the reporting period.

(2) Some problems have been encountered in obtaining repair parts. Continuous aggressive coordination and follow up action has been required to obtain critical parts for the M109 Howitzers. Assistance provided by the 23rd Artillery Group and Technical Representative from the USATAC has been required on a regular basis to obtain M109 Howitzer parts. The problem has been reduced by an improved reaction of the supply system to demand supported requisitions during the month of July.

(3) The battalion is assigned 43 personnel above TOE strength. TA-50-901 items were not on hand to equip all of these personnel upon arrival and initial requisitions were not filled on a timely basis. The S4 section made 8 visits and four telephone calls to the supporting supply agencies within a 23 day period. Assistance from 23d Artillery Group was requested by the battalion commander on 1 June 1967 and critical shortages were filled.

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(4) Supply of Class V for widely separated units has required maximum utilization of the battalion assets. (The battalion has fired over 91,000 rounds during the reporting period requiring an average daily transport of 66 tons.) Unit distribution of 155MM projectiles to Phu Loi was arranged with the supporting ASP. The remainder of the ammunition has been hauled by organizational transportation. 12

b. Maintenance. The M109 howitzer has presented the only significant maintenance problem. Contributing factors are the high ammunition expenditure (which is primarily fired with the maximum charge), the lack of a demand supported PLL, and the lack of experience in organization and supporting maintenance repairmen. Continuous command attention by commander of the battery, battalion and group has been required to keep the howitzers operational. Technical advice and instruction of the USATAC team has improved the maintenance skill of supporting maintenance units.

SECTION II

PART I, OBSERVATIONS

1. (U) Personnel and Administration

a. ITEM: Courier Service

(1) DISCUSSION: An enormous backlog of administration accumulates unless adequate planning for messenger service is accomplished. Most field positions cannot be served by vehicle messengers due to insecure routes. Units must be alert and take advantage of each aircraft arriving or departing the area in order to pass correspondence on a timely basis.

(2) OBSERVATION: The planning for each operation must include adequate provision for regular messenger service to include the use of aircraft when required.

2. (U) Intelligence

a. ITEM: Use of air observers to assist ground observers.

(1) DISCUSSION: Forward observer parties operating in heavy jungles frequently experience difficulty in orientation and observation. An air observer can work with several ground observers providing accurate information on the enemy, terrain, location of friendly elements. When contact is made with enemy forces the air and ground observers work as a team, complementing the observation capabilities of each other.

(2) OBSERVATION: This technique requires extra coordination and training on the part of radio operators, but proved to be very effective in dense jungles during combat operations. The air observer must not disclose the location of friendly elements by circling directly overhead.

3. (U) Training and Organization

a. ITEM: Predeployment training.

13 (1) DISCUSSION: Predeployment training should include, after completion of the training test, a comprehensive field exercise of at least seven days duration, requiring continuous 24 hour a day operation. The exercise should match the conditions and requirements that will be faced upon arrival in country. In order to provide the unit with an appreciation of the problems to be encountered the battalion should fire 1000 rounds per day for seven days (90% to be fired at the maximum charge). Resupply should be restricted to one convoy daily from a base camp and be accomplished partly by aerial resupply. All normal administration must be accomplished, primarily from the base camp, with some administration handled from the forward area.

(2) OBSERVATION: Units deploying to Vietnam need an appreciation of the magnitude of the tasks to be performed. An extended field exercise requiring sustained 24 hour a day operation, with a large ammunition expenditure and its associated logistics, will provide the unit with the experience needed to successfully perform its combat mission.

4. (U) Operations

a. ITEM: Construction of field fortifications.

(1) DISCUSSION: Construction of field fortifications in tactical positions during the rainy season is difficult due to the loose wet soil, high water table, and limited amount of material that can be carried into position with the unit. Improperly constructed bunkers are likely to collapse under the weight of overhead cover.

(2) OBSERVATION: Small size fortifications can be constructed with small pieces of lightweight material. Materials should be prefabricated according to a detailed plan of construction utilizing several small fortifications with overhead cover rather than one large bunker which requires heavy cumbersome materials which give way in loose soil.

b. ITEM: Operations in terrain impossible to wheeled vehicles.

(1) DISCUSSION: Self propelled artillery batteries can cross wet marshy terrain impassable by wheeled vehicles. Firing positions inaccessible to wheeled vehicles can be utilized by loading necessary equipment on the M109 howitzers, M548 cargo trucks and the M577 command post carrier.

(2) OBSERVATION: The use of tracked vehicles only allows the artillery to furnish fire support when terrain conditions prohibit the use of wheeled vehicles. Units must develop separate loading plans for this type employment and rely on aerial resupply for sustained operations.

5. Logistics

None

SECTION II

PART II, RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) Administration and Personnel

None

2. (U) Intelligence

None

3. (U) Training and Organization

That units programmed for Vietnam conduct an extended seven day field training exercise which will require sustained 24 hour a day operation and duplicate the ammunition expenditure, maintenance, resupply, and administrative requirements that will be experienced upon arrival in country.

4. (U) Operations

None

5. (U) Logistics

That continued command emphasis be placed on the training and qualification of M109 Howitzer Artillery mechanics at all echelons.

Walter H. Kennedy
WALTER G. KENNEDY
LTC, Artillery
Commanding Officer

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15
AVGE-C

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65) WD3EAA (U)

Department of the Army, Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, APO 96289,
20 August 1967

TO: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, ATTN: AVFB-FAC,
APO 96266

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery is approved.
2. (U) Section I, paragraph 1n. The R&R utilization is very low since most battalion personnel arrived in the RVN in April 1967 and were not eligible for R&R until mid July.
3. (C) Section I, paragraph 5a (2). Usage demand data for support of repair parts for the M109 howitzer has been in the formulative stage. Supply support has improved to some extent during the reporting period. Aggressive individual actions have assisted in overcoming the supply lag and lack of PLL in most areas. Priority effort in supplying adequate PLL and ASL items for this weapons system is required.
4. (C) Section I, paragraph 5a (3). Shortages of TA 50-901 were overcome to some extent by relocation of 23d Artillery Group assets. The time lag for issue of these common items still remains as a problem area. Increased stockage is required to support demands and reduce sporadic issue of tropical boots, tropical fatigues and body fragmentation armor.
5. (U) Section II, Part II, paragraph 3. Concur.



ROBERT J. KOCH
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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AVFB-PAC (8 Aug 67) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned

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DA, HQ, II FFORCEV Arty, APO 96266

8 SEP 1967

THRU: Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, APO 96266

Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN:
AVHGC-DH, APO 96307


Commander-In-Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN:
GPOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report of the 1st Battalion, 27th
Artillery adequately reflects the operations and lessons learned
during the reporting period.

2. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph 3. Concur.
The extended training exercise should parallel to the extent possible
the situation to be encountered in Vietnam stressing such items as
local security, short notice movements over roads likely to be under
enemy surveillance and 24 hour-a-day FDC operations.

3. (U) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph 5. Concur.
This is a matter of continued command attention.


RAYMOND P. MURPHY
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

17 AVFBC-H (8 Aug 67)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 1st Battalion, 27th
Artillery, 31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 16 SEP 1967

THRU: Commanding General, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96375

Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Dept of the Army,
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.
2. This command concurs with the recommendations of the basic report and the comments of the preceding indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
nc


R. E. WAMBEGANS
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DST (8 Aug 67)

4th Ind

21 OCT 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

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HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery (D3EA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning training and organization, section II, part I, paragraph 3. Concur. Recommend such activities be included in pre-deployment training.

b. Reference item concerning M109 Howitzer Artillery Mechanics, section II, part II, paragraph 5. Concur. Numerous actions have been taken to place increased emphasis on this program. Field maintenance training teams conducted training for all units during the period May through July 1967. Recommendations have been forwarded to USCONARC requesting added emphasis on SP artillery.

3. (U) Unit will be notified of actions and comments by routine indorsement which returns this report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

William E. Kennedy

W. E. KENNEDY

Cpt, AGC

Asst Adjutant General

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GPOP-DT (8 Aug 67)

5th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
from HQ, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery (UIC: WD3EAA)(RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 15 NOV 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



MAVRIN SNYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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